Even before the drone strike that killed three U.S. soldiers in Jordan on Sunday, the Biden administration was planning for such a moment and debating how to strike back in a way that would deter Iran’s proxy forces and send a signal that Tehran would not miss.
But the options range from unsatisfactory to very risky.
Mr. Biden could order attacks on proxy forces, a significant escalation of the brutal attacks he has carried out in Syria, Iraq and Yemen in recent weeks. So far, these attacks have undermined the capabilities of Iran-backed groups, which have carried out more than 160 attacks. But they have failed to deter these groups, as Mr. Biden himself noted ten days ago.
Mr. Biden could decide to take action against Iran’s suppliers of drones and missiles, possibly within Iranian territory, which poses a much higher risk. His first targets could well be members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, many of whom are stationed in Syria and Iraq. Depending on how these attacks are carried out, it could open another war front with a far more powerful opponent and prompt Tehran to accelerate its nuclear program.
In short, it would force Mr. Biden to do everything he has so far tried to avoid.
There are options in between, officials say, and attacks could be combined with a back-channel message to the Iranians that they should contain the attack and not escalate it. Such signals have been successful before, including after the US-ordered killing of Qassim Suleimani, the head of the powerful Quds Force, in 2020. Then as now, there were fears of an all-out war in the Middle East that would spiral into disarray the United States and its allies against Iran and its proxies. Both sides backed away.
But the brew of political pressure, military calculation and regional fragility is very different today than it was four years ago, even if there are indications that Iran also does not want to go to direct war, especially when its own economy is weak.
“There are no good decisions, but the deaths and injuries of so many U.S. troops and SEALs require a strong response,” said James G. Stavridis, the retired Navy admiral who now works for the Carlyle Group, a global investment firm.
“A multi-day air campaign against all proxies, coupled with a ‘last chance warning’ to Iran, is justified,” he said. “The Pentagon should create options that directly target Iranian weapons production facilities, naval facilities and intelligence systems in case the mullahs want to launch another round. A strong offensive cyberattack would be another viable option, either alone or in conjunction with kinetic attacks.”
Because Iran has been an adversary for so long – spanning eight presidencies – there is no shortage of such options. The United States has identified the major drone factories and their foreign suppliers that are driving Russian attacks in Ukraine and supplying Hezbollah, the Houthis and other proxy groups. (It’s not yet clear whether the drone or drones that killed Americans in Jordan on Sunday were Iranian-made, but that was the working assumption of American officials.)
American forces have planned attacks on Iranian missile sites and air bases in the event a conflict breaks out between Iran and Israel. There was even a detailed option for a cyberattack against Iran, codenamed “Nitro Zeus,” to disable its air defenses, communications systems and key parts of its power grid. That plan was shelved in 2015 after Iran and six other nations reached a nuclear deal. Israel has conspicuously practiced bombing raids, simulating attacks on the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility and its deep underground alternative site called Fordow.
But no one put these plans into action for a reason: neither Washington nor Tehran could see a way out of the cycle of attacks and counterattacks once full-scale conflict broke out. And although American officials were confident that the United States would ultimately win, the potential for damage to American allies, especially Israel, seemed hard to imagine. Even President Donald J. Trump withdrew from a planned strike.
None of these considerations were reflected in the social media posts and press releases issued Sunday by Republicans, who have so far criticized Mr. Biden’s answers as too calibrated. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky called for a “crippling cost” to Iran, “not only on front-line terrorist proxies, but also on their Iranian sponsors who wear American blood as a badge of honor,” Sen. John Cornyn, the Republican from Texas, called for attacks on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its military elite – and the guardians of the nuclear program.
“Maybe it’s time to kill another Iranian general?” Representative Daniel Crenshaw, also from Texas, wrote on social media on Sunday, recalling the Suleimani attack. “That could send the right message.” Mr. Crenshaw is a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, where he lost an eye in an explosion.
Such calls have undeniable political appeal, especially at the start of an election year, and no one has been more vocal than Mr. Trump — who, while in office, made no mention of his own concerns about killing Iranians and escalating a conflict. Even Mr. Biden’s own advisers admit that everything they have done so far to “restore deterrence,” to use the military’s term for their efforts, has failed on target.
But it is not yet clear who exactly Mr. Biden wants to deter. American intelligence officials say that while Iran provides weapons, funding and sometimes intelligence to its proxy groups, there is no evidence that it is in charge – meaning it may not have known about the attack in Jordan in advance.
The Iran-backed militias, calling themselves the Axis of Resistance, claimed responsibility for the attack on the outpost in Jordan, saying it was a “continuation of our approach to resisting American occupying forces in Iraq and the region “.
An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Nasser Kanaani, said at a news conference in Tehran on Monday that the militias “do not take orders from Iran” and operate independently. It’s a convenient argument that maintains a certain sense of deniability for Tehran.
But the speed with which Iran sought to distance itself from the attack rather than accept it made clear that the disadvantages of using proxies are the same as the advantages: Tehran is blamed for everything the militias do, even for actions that Iranians believe are also provocative.
“This is the inherent risk of Iran’s proxy war strategy,” said Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “It was a brilliant success, but only if retaliation was focused on proxies and not on Iran’s own territory. There is now a real danger that the situation in the region will get even further out of hand.”
Mr Biden is running out of middle ground options. The sanctions have been exhausted; There is hardly a sector of the Iranian economy that the US and Europe are not already punishing, and China continues to buy Iranian oil. He could authorize “attack packages” against a variety of proxies, but that would embolden some of them and give some of them the status they desire as legitimate American enemies.
And, following Admiral Stavridis’ suggestion, one could rely on cyberattacks, more secretive and deniable ways to make one’s point clear. But the lesson from the last decade of cyber conflict with Iran – in both directions – is that it looks easier in the movies than in reality. It is difficult to gain access to critical networks and even more difficult to create lasting impact. The most famous U.S.-Israeli cyberattack on Iran 15 years ago, which targeted its nuclear centrifuges, slowed the nuclear program for a year or two but did not put it out of business.
And that’s the challenge for Mr. Biden now: In the middle of an election, with two wars underway, he must put Iran’s support of attacks on Americans out of business — without starting another war.
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2024-01-29 16:51:47
www.nytimes.com
